

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 00771 01 OF 03 191723Z

43

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

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O 191604Z JAN 76

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8845

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 MOSCOW 0771

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, UR, AO

SUBJ: SOVIET POLICY IN ANGOLA

1. BEGIN SUMMARY. THOUGH OUR INFORMATION ON SUBJECT IS FAR FROM COMPLETE, OUR ANALYSIS OF SOVIET POLICY ON ANGOLA CONCLUDES THAT IN SOVIET VIEW THEIR ACTIONS TO DATE ARE JUSTIFIED AND ON BALANCE SUCCESSFUL, EXCEPT IN REGARD TO THEIR IMPACT ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS. WE CAN DISCERN NO STRONG U.S. LEVERAGE IN BILATERAL RELATIONS, HOWEVER, WHICH DOES NOT IMPINGE ON U.S. INTERESTS AT LEAST AS MUCH AS SOVIET. IT APPEARS TO US, THEREFORE, THAT--UNLESS PRESSURE CAN BE BROUGHT TO BEAR IN WASYS NOT APPARENT TO US HERE--THE BEST SOVIETS WILL BE WILLING TO DO IN ORDER TO SHORE UP DETENTE IMAGE IN U.S. WOULD BE TO REFRAIN FROM LARGE ADDITIONAL INCREMENTS IN SOVIET AND CUBAN ASSISTANCE TO MPLA, TO PAY LIP SERVICE TO IDEA OF COALITION (UNDER MPLA HEGEMONY), AND PERHAPS TO PROMISE GRADUAL REDUCTION IN SOVIET AND CUBAN PRESENCE IF SOUTH AFRICA WITHDRAWS. EVEN THESE LIMITED CONCESSIONS WOULD PROBABLY BE IMPLICITLY CONTINGENT ON MPLA MAINTAINING MILITARY INITIATIVE. END SUMMARY.

2. ALTHOUGH WE ARE MISSING SEVERAL IMPORTANT PIECES OF THE PUZZLE, IT MAY BE USEFUL AT THIS POINT TO PUT DOWN OUR IMPRESSIONS AS TO THE REASONS FOR MOSCOW'S

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 00771 01 OF 03 191723Z

ACTIONS IN ANGOLA AND TO ADDRESS THE POSSIBILITY OF

A KREMLIN RETREAT FROM A POLICY WHICH HAS HAD SOME SUCCESS ON THE GROUND IN AFRICA BUT WHICH HAS INEVITABLY RESULTED IN DAMAGE TO U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS.

3. REASONS FOR SOVIET ANGOLA POLICY. WE CAN THINK OF EIGHT INTERTWINING CAUSES WHICH IMPELLED THE SOVIETS TO ACT IN ANGOLA:

A. SUPPORT FOR NATIONAL LIBERATION. GROMYKO'S SEPTEMBER KOMMUNIST ARTICLE, WHICH LAID OUT THE PRINCIPLES AND FRAMEWORK OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY IN PREPARATION FOR THE 25TH PARTY CONGRESS, STRESSED THREE MAJOR FOUNDATIONS OF THAT POLICY--I.E., 1) CONSOLIDATION OF THE SOCIALIST CAMP; 2) DETENTE WITH THE WEST; 3) SUPPORT FOR NATIONAL LIBERATION. THE SOVIETS HAVE STATED REPEATEDLY THAT THEY SEE NO CONTRADICTION BETWEEN SUPPORT FOR NATIONAL LIBERATION AND DETENTE. ANGOLA WOULD SEEM TO BE A CLASSIC EXAMPLE OF THAT THESIS. ALTHOUGH THE SOVIETS AT PRESENT JUSTIFY THEIR ASSISTANCE TO THE MPLA AS AID TO A LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT, THE FOUNDATION OF THEIR ANGOLA POLICY--IN THEIR EYES AS WELL AS IN THEIR PROPAGANDA--IS IN THEIR ASSERTED RIGHT TO ASSIST A NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT, WITH OR WITHOUT THE WIND AT ITS SAILS.

B. SUPPORT FOR AN ALLY. THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN BACKING THE MPLA SINCE 1956. ONE OF THEIR CLEAR AIMS IN ANGOLA IS TO DEMONSTRATE TO OTHERS THAT THE USSR IS A RELIABLE FRIEND AND THAT IT WILL NOT LET DOWN AN ALLY. IN THIS REGARD, IT MIGHT BE OF POSSIBLE INTEREST TO NOTE THAT NETO WAS PRESENT AT THE 24TH PARTY CONGRESS OF THE CPSU.

C. MAINTENANCE OF REVOLUTIONARY CREDENTIALS. IT IS IMPORTANT FOR MOSCOW TO KEEP UP ITS REVOLUTIONARY CREDENTIALS, NOT ONLY BECAUSE IT ASPIRES TO LEADERSHIP IN THE THIRD WORLD AND IN THE COMMUNIST AND "PROGRESSIVE" CAMPS, BUT FOR PURPOSES OF MAINTAINING ITS OWN INTERNAL LEGITIMACY AS WELL. THE

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MOSCOW 00771 01 OF 03 191723Z

MESSAGE THAT THE USSR ADOPTS A "PRINCIPLED" POSITION IN ITS SUPPORT FOR "WARS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION" IS THEREFORE IMPORTANT TO THE SOVIETS BOTH INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY.

D. THE CHINA FACTOR. PEKING AND MOSCOW ARE LOCKED IN WHAT BOTH SIDES REGARD AS A "ZERO-SUM" GAME WHEREBY WHAT IS GOOD FOR MOSCOW'S NATIONAL INTERESTS

IS THOUGH TO BE BAD FOR PEKING'S, AND VICE VERSA. THE FACT THAT THE CHINESE WERE SUPPORTING A GROUP OPPOSED TO THE MPLA MADE IT ALMOST A CERTAINTY THAT MOSCOW WOULD FEEL COMPELLED TO TAKE SOME STEPS TO BOLSTER ITS CLIENT IN ANGOLA. THE SOVIETS DESIRE TO DIMINISH CHINESE INFLUENCE IN THE THIRD WORLD AND TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THERE IS NO TRUTH IN PEKING'S ASSERTION THAT THE SOVIETS ARE A STATUS QUO POWER BASICALLY IN OPPOSITION TO THE ASPIRATIONS OF THE THIRD WORLD.

E. ENHANCE THE SOVIET IMAGE IN AFRICA AND ELSEWHERE. THE SOVIETS SAW THE APRIL 25 COUP IN PORTUGAL AS AN EXTRAORDINARY OPPORTUNITY TO STEP UP THEIR INFLUENCE AND PRESTIGE IN AFRICA. IN THIS REGARD, THEY WERE UNDOUBTEDLY ALSO ENCOURAGED BY THE SUCCESS OF FRELIMO IN MOZAMBIQUE AND WERE ANXIOUS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE TIDE WAS MOVING IN THEIR DIRECTION IN AFRICA. THE KREMLIN REGARDS ITS FORTUITOUS DIRECT OPPOSITION TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN POLICY IN ANGOLA AS A MAJOR POLITICAL AND PROPAGANDA TRIUMPH. THE FACT THAT THIS HAS STRUCK A SYMPATHETIC CHORD IN COUNTRIES AS IMPORTANT AS NIGERIA MAY WELL BE CONSIDERED BY THE KREMLIN AS AMPLE JUSTIFICATION IN ITSELF FOR MOSCOW'S ANGOLA POLICY.

F. SOVIET INTERNAL IMPERATIVES FOR SUCCESS IN ANGOLA. GIVEN RECENT FOREIGN POLICY REVERSES, PARTICULARLY EGYPT BUT PORTUGAL AS WELL, MOSCOW PROBABLY FELT THAT IT COULD NOT AFFORD ANOTHER OBVIOUS SETBACK, PARTICULARLY IN A SITUATION WHERE THE U.S. WAS SEEN TO BE THE "WINNER." THIS IS DOUBLY THE CASE IN VIEW OF STRONG U.S. CONGRESSIONAL AND SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 MOSCOW 00771 01 OF 03 191723Z

PUBLIC OPPOSITION TO INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA. (OUR GUESS WOULD BE THAT LOCAL EXPERTS ON THE U.S. ADVISED THAT OUR DOMESTIC CONSTRAINTS WERE SUCH THAT IT WAS UNLIKELY WE WOULD FACE UP TO A "TOUGH" SOVIET POLICY IN ANGOLA.) WITH THE PARTY CONGRESS APPROACHING, ANGOLA THUS OFFERED A CONCRETE FOREIGN POLICY GAIN IN SUPPORT OF ORTHODOX IDEOLOGICAL THEMES AT AN OPPORTUNE TIME FOR BREZHNEV.

G. COUNTERING THE U.S. WHETHER THEY ACTUALLY BELIEVE IT OR NOT IS ANOTHER QUESTION, BUT OUR VARIOUS CONTACTS AS WELL AS SOURCES FOR LOCAL NEWSMEN HAVE CONSISTENTLY ARGUED THAT, IN INCREASING ASSISTANCE TO THE MPLA ABOVE MODEST LEVELS, THE USSR WAS MERELY REACTING TO U.S. MOVES IN ANGOLA.

FURTHERMORE, THE CLAIM IS PUT FORTH THAT THE USSR HAS NO DESIRE TO MAKE A PUBLIC ISSUE OF ANGOLA AND THAT THE SOVIETS "CANNOT UNDERSTAND" WHY THE AMERICANS HAVE BROUGHT ANGOLA TO THE FOREFRONT. THE MOST RECENT PUBLIC STATEMENT OF THIS THESIS WAS AN ARTICLE IN THE JANUARY 16 NOVOYE VREMYA DEVOTED TO ALLEGED CIA INTERFERENCE IN ANGOLA. ACCORDING TO THE ARTICLE, BASED ON AMERICAN PRESS SOURCES, A FORTY COMMITTEE MEETING IN JANUARY 1975 APPROVED A CIA PROPOSAL TO BUY FNLA AND UNITA AGREEMENT TO TORPEDO THE THREE FACTION ACCORD ON COALITION GOVERNMENT SIGNED IN KENYA JANUARY 5. THE ARTICLE STATES THAT ROBERTO HAD BEEN IN THE CIA POCKET SINCE 1961 AND THAT SAVIMBI WAS "ALSO LINKED TO U.S. INTELLIGENCE." THESE LEADERS THEREFORE "CAME OUT AGAINST" THE MPLA IN FEBRUARY AND THE TWO GROUPS THEN RECEIVED 10 MILLION DOLLARS FROM THE CIA IN JUNE. THE CLEAR IMPLICATION THAT A SOVIET READER IS INTENDED TO DRAW IS THAT IT WAS THE U.S. WHICH FIRST UPPED THE ANTE IN ANGOLA. WHILE MANY SOVIETS WILL BE MORE THAN SKEPTICAL OF THEIR OWN PROPAGANDA, THE FACT THAT THIS RATIONALE HAS BEEN WIDELY CIRCULATED WITHIN THE USSR WILL MAKE IT THAT MUCH MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE SOVIETS TO WITHDRAW FROM OR TONE DOWN THEIR EFFORTS IN ANGOLA UNLESS IT CAN BE SHOWN THAT THEY DERIVE CLEAR BENEFIT

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 05 MOSCOW 00771 01 OF 03 191723Z

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SECRET

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 00771 02 OF 03 191739Z

43

ACTION SS-25

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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8846

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 MOSCOW 0771

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

H. ECONOMIC-STRATEGIC FACTORS. GEOPOLITICS IS STILL TAKEN SERIOUSLY IN MOSCOW AND THE SOVIETS ARE NOT INSENSITIVE TO THE FACT THAT ANGOLA IS A COMPARATIVELY RICH, UNDERPOPULATED COUNTRY WITH SUBSTANTIAL NATURAL RESOURCES, INCLUDING CABINDAN OIL. THE SOVIET NAVY WOULD PROBABLY, AT THE VERY LEAST, FIND IT USEFUL TO HAVE ACCESS TO ANGOLAN PORTS ON A BASIS SIMILAR TO THAT AVAILABLE IN GUINEA. IN ANY CASE, WE DO NOT FIND CHONA'S THESIS ON THE SOVIET GRAND STRATEGY FOR AFRICA (LUSAKA 115) TO BE ENTIRELY IMPLAUSIBLE, EVEN THOUGH THE INITIAL SOVIET IMPLUSE MAY FLOW MORE FROM EXPLOITING TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY THAN EXECUTING A MASTER PLAN.

4. THE CUBAN FACTOR. FOR A COMBINATION OF THE ABOVE REASONS THE POLITBURO PROBABLY FELT IT HAD LITTLE CHOICE BUT TO TAKE ACTION IN ANGOLA TO SUPPORT THE MPLA. WHAT WAS NEEDED WAS A QUICK POWERFUL STROKE THAT WOULD TURN THE TABLES IN FAVOR OF THEIR OWN CLIENT AND THUS PUT THE SOVIETS IN A STRONGER BARGAINING POSITION. SINCE THE MPLA ITSELF WAS PROBABLY IN NO POSITION TO UTILIZE THE MASSIVE SOVIET AID ACCORDED TO IT, THE SOVIETS DECIDED TO MAKE USE OF A CUBAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE. OUR GUESS WOULD BE, HOWEVER, THAT THE SOVIETS ARE WELL AWARE OF THE REALITY OF THE SITUATION IN
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 00771 02 OF 03 191739Z

ANGOLA AND PROBABLY SEE THE DANGER OF THE CUBANS REMAINING FOR AN EXTENDED PERIOD OF TIME IN HOSTILE TERRITORY AS AN OCCUPYING FORCE. FOR WHAT IT IS WORTH, SEVERAL OF OUR SOVIET CONTACTS HAVE ASSERTED STRONGLY THAT THE USSR DOES NOT DESIRE A "MILITARY SOLUTION" IN ANGOLA, WHILE OTHERS HAVE RECENTLY HINGED THAT AN MPLA/UNITA COALITION MIGHT BE THE ULTIMATE SOLUTION.

5. MOSCOW'S OBJECTIVES. THE SOVIETS OBVIOUSLY HAVE DECIDED TO MAKE A MAJOR COMMITMENT TO ENSURE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT CONTROLLED BY THE MPLA, ASSISTED AND SUPPORTED BY THE USSR, WHICH WOULD DERIVE A FAVORABLE POSITION COMPARABLE TO WHAT IT CURRENTLY ENJOYS IN GUINEA

AND SOMALIA. A "COALITIONGOVERNMENT" UNDER MPLA HEGEMONY IS QUITE CONSISTENT WITH SUCH A SOVIET AIM SO LONG AS THE MPLA WOULD REMAIN THE DOMINANT FORCE. WHAT THE SOVIETS PROBABLY DESIRE IS A VICTORY IN ANGOLA WHICH WOULD TAKE PLACE GRADUALLY ENOUGH SO THAT SOVIET DETENTE INTERESTS ARE NOT AFFECTED THEREBY. IF THE SOVIETS SAW GOOD PROSPECTS FOR SUCH A GRADUAL VICTORY THEY WOULD PROBABLY RESIST PRESSURE FROM THE MPLA ITSELF, OR PERHAPS FROM THE CUBANS, TO GO FRO BROKE IN ANGOLA.

6. FAVORABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN AFRICA. IN THIS REGARD, ALTHOUGH THE SOVIETS DID NOT ACHIEVE THE OPTIMUM AT THE RECENT OAU CONFERENCE, THEY ARE ALMOST CERTAINLY PLEASED WITH THEIR LONG RANGE AFRICAN POLICY OF PATIENT SUPPORT FOR "NATIONAL LIBERATION," AND REGARD OVERALL TENDENCIES AS MOVING IN THEIR DIRECTION. RELATIONS WITH CERTAIN KEY COUNTRIES SEEM TO HAVE BEEN STRENGTHENED, E.G., NIGERIA, CHANA, TANZANIA, AND MOZAMBIQUE (WHICH PREVIOUSLY LEANED TO CHINA). NETO HIMSELF IS GENUAINELY POPULAR WITH SEVERAL IMPORTANT AFRICAN COUNTRIES, SUCH AS TANZANIA WHICH MAKES IT POSSIBLE FOR THE SOVIETS TO RIDE ON HIS COATTAILS TO A DEGREE. IN SOVIET EYES THE U.S. IS PAYING THE INEVITABLE PRICE OF BEING POPULARLY IDENTIFIED IN AFRICA (NO MATTER HOW
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MOSCOW 00771 02 OF 03 191739Z

UNJUSTLY) AS A FORMER SUPPORTER OF PORTUGUESE COLONIALISM AND A PRESENT SUPPORTER OF WHITE REGIMES IN THE SOUTH. FINALLY, IF THE MPLA RACKS UP FURTHER MILITARY VICTORIES, THE SOVIETS PROBABLY HOPE TO GARNER ADDITIONAL BACKING IN AFRICA.

7. UNEXPECTED EVENTS. ESPECIALLY INLIGHT OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN INVOLVEMENT, THE SOVIETS WERE, HOWEVER, PROBABLY SURPRISED AT THE VEHEMENCE OF AT LEAST SOME OF THE AFRICAN MODERATES WHO CONTINUE TO OPPOSE SOVIET AND CUBAN INTERFERENCE IN AFRICAN AFFAIRS. THEY WERE ALSO SEEMINGLY GENUINELY SURPRISED BY THE PUBLIC REACTION IN THE UNITED STATES AND BY THE PRIMACY WHICH THE ANGOLA SITUATION NOW HAS IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS. IN FACT, THIS DETENTE CONNECTION HAS PROBABLY BEEN THE SINGLE MOST IMPORTANT MISTAKE MOSCOW POLICYMAKERS HAVE MADE REGARDING ANGOLA. WHILE IT IS STILL ONLY ONE OF MANY FACTORS IN THEIR CALCULATIONS, IT HAS CLEARLY BECOME AN EXTREMELY SERIOUS ONE.

8. THE U.S. ANGLE. IT THEREFORE SEEMS TO US THAT

EXCEPT FOR ITS EFFECT ON RELATIONS WITH THE U.S.
THE SOVIETS HAVE NO REASON TO FEEL DISSATISFIED
WITH THE POLICIES THEY HAVE BEEN FOLLOWING IN
ANGOLA. FURTHERMORE, IT IS PERHAPS IMPORTANT TO
KEEP IN MIND THAT AT LEAST SOME KREMLIN "AMERICA
EXPERTS," AS NOTED ABOVE, POSSIBLY SINGED ON TO
THE ORIGINAL DECISION TO STEP UP THE SOVIET EFFORT
IN ANGOLA ON THE GROUNDS THAT DOMESTIC PRESSURES
IN THE UNITED STATES PRECLUDED A TOUGH U.S. RESPONSE
TO SUCH SOVIET MOVES. IF THIS IS THE CASE, "EXPERTS"
WILL FIND IT BUREAUCRATICALLY DIFFICULT
AT THIS STAGE TO TURN AROUND AND ARGUE THAT ANGOLA
COULD HAVE A LASTING HARMFUL EFFECT ON U.S.-SOVIET
RELATIONS. MORE IMPORTANT, THE SOVIETS PROBABLY
BELIEVE THAT, GIVEN OUR DOMESTIC DIFFICULTIES, THE
VARIOUS CONCRETE LEVERS AVAILABLE TO US FOR DEALING
WITH THE KREMLIN OVER ANGOLA ARE NOT VERY IMPRESSIVE.
UNLESS WE ARE CAPABLE OF RESPONDING EFFECTIVELY ON THE GROUND,
SALT IS TOO IMPORTANT TO CONNECT WITH ANGOLA, WE HAVE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 MOSCOW 00771 02 OF 03 191739Z

ALREADY RULED OUT GRAIN, MFN WAS ONLY A DISTANT
HOPE ANYWAY, AND CUTTING DOWN EXCHANGES WOULD BE
INEFFECTIVE AND PERHAPS INAPPROPRIATE. MOST
IMPORTANT OF ALL, THE TOP LEADERS IN THE KREMLIN
PROBABLY DO NOT REALLY UNDERSTAND THE POSSIBLE
LONG TERM EFFECTS WHICH ANGOLA COULD HAVE ON U.S.
VIEWS OF THE USSR.

9. THE SOVIET DILEMMA. WHILE INTERNAL PRESSURE
TO CHANGE POLICY IN ANGOLA IS THEREFORE NOT LIKELY TO BE VERY
GREAT, MOSCOW DOES NOT WANT ANGOLA TO IMPINGE ON
DETENTE, TO AFFECT U.S. PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS, AND
ESPECIALLY TO INFLUENCE THE U.S. ELECTIONS. BUT
IT CANNOT AFFORD A DEFEAT OR A WITHDRAWAL UNDER
OBVIOUS PRESSURE. AT THIS STAGE THE KREMLIN
OBVIOUSLY WOULD NOT WANT TO BE CHARGED WITH "SELLING
OUT" ITS CLIENTS AND IT COULD BE TO SOME EXTENT
IN PAWN TO NETO, AS IT WAS TO HANOI FROM 1965-1975.

10. THE LIMITS OF SOVIET FLEXIBILITY. AT THE
SAME TIME, THE KREMLIN DOES NOT WANT TO GIVE THE
U.S., OR ANYONE ELSE, THE IMPRESSION THAT WASHINGTON
HAS SIGNIFICANT LEVERAGE BECAUSE OF MOSCOW'S DESIRE
TO ENHANCE THE PROSPECTS OF PROPONENTS OF DETENTE
IN THE UPCOMING U.S. ELECTIONS. GIVEN THE EXTENT

SECRET

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SECRET

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 00771 03 OF 03 191745Z

43

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

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O 191604Z JAN 76

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

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S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 3 MOSCOW 0771

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

OF THEIR COMMITMENT, ANY MOVE THE SOVIETS MAKE TO
REDUCE THEIR (AND CUBA'S) PRESENCE, IF ANNOUNCED
AT ALL, WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY BE JUSTIFIED ON
PRACTICAL GROUNDS--I.E., THE ASSISTANCE IS NO
LONGER NEEDED--RATHER THAN ON GROUNDS OF PRINCIPLE.
IN ANY CASE, A SETTLEMENT WITHOUT QUICK AND CLEAR
SOUTH AFRICAN WITHDRAWAL FROM ANGOLA APPEARS MOST
UNLIKELY. BUT THE DEPARTURE OF THE SOUTH AFRICANS
MIGHT POSSIBLY FORM THE BASIS FOR A SOLUTION WHICH
THE SOVIETS COULD BUY SINCE IT COULD BE PORTRAYED
AS A CLEAR VICTORY -- I.E., RESOLUTE SOVIET ACTION
FORCED THE RACIST AGRESSORS OUT OF ANGOLA. IF
THE SOUTH AFRICANS WERE TO WITHDRAW, SOVIET SUPPLIES
OF NEW EQUIPMENT COULD BE SCALED DOWN, AND IF THE
U.S. SUPPLY LINEK RUNS DRY, NETO WOULD BE LEFT
IN A FAVORABLE MILITARY POSTURE. SOME CUBANS COULD
ALSO BE WITHDRAWN WHILE OTHERS COULD BE LIMITED MORE
AND MORE TO SUPPORT AND ADVISORY ROLES, IN ORDER TO
AVOID CASUALTIES AND PRISONERS. AT SOME POINT,
THE CUBANS WOULD HAVE TO GO. BUT THE SOVIETS,
HAVING DEMONSTRATED CONVINCING WILLINGNESS TO COUNTER
ANY MOVES TO DISPLACE THE MPLA, COULD WITHDRAW INTO
THE BACKGROUND AND ALLOW FOR AN "AFRICAN" SOLUTION
TO THE ANGOLA PROBLEM, AT THE SAME TIME GUARANTEEING
MPLA CONTROL OF AT LEAST THE CENTRAL AND CABINDAN
AREAS OF THE COUNTRY, AND PERHAPS OF THE NORTH AS

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 00771 03 OF 03 191745Z

WELL. SUCH A SOLUTION WOULD CLEARLY LEAVE THE MPLA IN A STRONG POSITION TO EXTEND ITS POWER MILITARILY. THIS, IN TURN, COULD CREATE STEADY PRESSURE IN AFRICA FOR ADDITIONAL RECOGNITION OF THE MPLA REGIME. IN OTHER WORDS, ANY NEGOTIATED OUTCOME WHICH SEEMS FEASIBLE TO US WOULD NOT BE A HAPPY ONE FOR U.S. POLICY. BUT, ON THE OTHER HAND, WE CANNOT CONCEIVE OF THE SOVIETS SETTling FOR LESS, AT LEAST AT THIS STAGE.

11. IN SUM, THE CURRENT SOVIET ASSESSMENT IS PROBABLY THAT THEY HAD AMPLE REASON FOR TAKING RESOLUTE ACTION IN ANGOLA AND ARE OPERATING FROM A POSITION OF STRENGTH. GIVEN THE EXTENT OF THEIR INVESTMENT, THEY CANNOT NOW AFFORD TO ACCEPT ANY SOLUTION WHICH WOULD SEEM TO ENCOMPASS A LOSS OF FACE. HOWEVER, FOR REASONS OF DETENTE AND THE FUTURE OF U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS THE SOVIETS MIGHT BE INDUCED TO BUY SOME SORT OF COMPROMISE WHICH FAVORED THE MPLA. WITHDRAWAL OF SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES (WHICH COULD BE IN OUR INTERESTS AS WELL) IS POSSIBLY THE KEY TO REACHING SOME SORT OF SOLUTION TO THE ANGOLAN DILEMMA.

12. DEPARTMENT PASS OTHER POSTS AS DESIRED.
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